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VỀ CHẾ ĐỘ NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM

Khuôn khổ của chương này không cho phép nói nhiều đến những ưu điểm và khuyết điểm trong đời tổng thống Ngô Đình Diệm. Ông lên cầm quyền ở miền Nam từ 1954 mãi đến 1963, tức là 9 năm sau, Phật giáo đồ mới đứng dậy chống ông, dù ngay từ buổi đầu nắm chính quyền ông đã có ý chèn ép Phật giáo. Trong thời gian đó ông đã bị nhiều lực lượng chống đối nhưng ông đã khôn khéo vượt thắng được.

… Về chính trị, lưng dựa của chính quyền là đồng bào Công giáo di cư. Về quân sự, trước hết, ông Diệm đưa vào gần mười vạn binh sĩ di cư từ miền Bắc vào Nam, trong số đó phần tử chính là Nùng và Bảo An Binh...

http://www.quangduc.com/lichsu/17vnpgsuluan3-37.html

Luận :

Rõ ràng là Phật Giáo không có vấn đề chống Diệm nhưng là những thành phần khác chống.

Từ nguy cơ bị triệt hạ đã làm chính quyền Diệm tổ chức lại cơ cấu cầm quyền trở thành độc quyền Đảng trị , Gia đình trị có sự góp mặt của Tôn Giáo Thiên Chúa giáo vào việc huấn luyện người. Đây là 1 hành động tách rời quần chúng, nhân dân để tạo thành 1 nhóm riêng cầm quyền đi trái với dân chủ.

Ông Diệm là người khôn khéo, tại sao lại chèn ép Phật giáo ? trong khi Phật giáo không có vấn đề gì chống ông. Nguy cơ bị triệt hạ của ông Diệm là Phật giáo ? nếu không tại sao ông không lo tiêu diệt đối thủ thực sự của ông mà rỗi hơi đi "chèn ép" Phật giáo?
Ông Diệm là người khôn khéo, tại sao ông không biết là dân VN phần lớn theo đạo Phật ? Hay ông có ý định bắt người dân đổi đạo ?
Duy_Khang trích "tài liệu" từ trang web "Quảng Đức" mà nói khách quan cho ông Diệm hay CQ dưới thời ông Diệm mới là chuyện lạ. Vì nếu nói tốt hay khách quan thì sự "tự thiêu" có còn "chính nghĩa" ?
Thắc mắc chút : số người miền Bắc di cư khoảng 800.000 (trong chiến dịch Opération Passage to Freedom). Nếu số quân mà ông Diệm "mang" vào Nam khoảng 100.000 thì có nhiều quá không ?

[Gánh Hàng Hoa]

VỀ CHẾ ĐỘ NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM

Khuôn khổ của chương này không cho phép nói nhiều đến những ưu điểm và khuyết điểm trong đời tổng thống Ngô Đình Diệm. Ông lên cầm quyền ở miền Nam từ 1954 mãi đến 1963, tức là 9 năm sau, Phật giáo đồ mới đứng dậy chống ông, dù ngay từ buổi đầu nắm chính quyền ông đã có ý chèn ép Phật giáo. Trong thời gian đó ông đã bị nhiều lực lượng chống đối nhưng ông đã khôn khéo vượt thắng được. Ông đã loại được tướng Nguyễn Văn Hinh, tham mưu trưởng quân đội miền Nam, lật được quốc trưởng Bảo Đại, đàn áp được lực lượng Bình Xuyên, các giáo phái Cao Đài và Hòa Hảo. Ông bị ám sát hụt tại Ba Mê Thuột ngày 21 tháng 5 năm 1957. Ông lại may mắn thoát được cuộc đảo chính ngày 11 tháng 11 năm 1960.

Ngày 27.2.1962 ông lại thoát chết trong cuộc dội bom dinh Độc Lập của hai sĩ quan quân đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa. Để củng cố chính quyền, ông Diệm đã tổ chức Cần Lao Nhân Vị Cách Mạng Đảng và Phong Trào Cách Mạng QuốcGia. Cần Lao Nhân Vị được tổ chức để trở thành đảng độc nhất ở miền Nam: những thành viên của các đảng hái khác, khi vào đảng Cần Lao Nhân Vị phải vâng theo luật đảng để kiểm soát đảng mình. Và do đó không có một đảng phái đối lập nào có thể tồn tại. Cờ của đảng là một nền lục trên có ba ngôi sao đỏ tượng trưng cho Cần Lao, Cách Mạng và Nhân Vị. Phong trào cách mạng quốc gia chỉ là cơ quan thừa hành mệnh lệnh của đảng. Nhiệm vụ của tổ chức này là tuyên truyền chính trị. Liên hệ vào tổ chức này có các tổ chức Thanh Niên Cộng Hòa, Phụ Nữ Liên Đới, Công Chức Cách Mạng v.v… Về chính trị, lưng dựa của chính quyền là đồng bào Công giáo di cư. Về quân sự, trước hết, ông Diệm đưa vào gần mười vạn binh sĩ di cư từ miền Bắc vào Nam, trong số đó phần tử chính là Nùng và Bảo An Binh. Sau khi loại được tướng Nguyễn Văn Hinh, ông thu phục được quân đội miền Nam và bắt đầu võ trang quân đội này bằng viện trợ Hoa Kỳ. Ngoài ra tổ chức Mật Vụ, quân sự và dân sự, lại đóng một vai trò vừa quan trọng vừa kinh khiếp trong sự dò xét, bắt bớ và thủ tiêu các phần tử đối lập. Về phương diện ý thức hệ, chính quyền Ngô Đình Diệm mượn một phần truyết thuyết của Emmanuel Mounier làm thành thuyết Nhân Vị, thêm vào ý niệm Duy Linh rút cảm hứng từ đức tin Cơ Đốc. Từ năm1956, thuyết này đã được các linh mục giảng dạy tại trường Đại Học Văn Khoa Sài Gòn. Trung Tâm Nhân Vị Vĩnh Long do tổng giám mục Ngô Đình Thục thành lập khi ông còn làm giám mục ở giáo khu này. Tất cả công chức toàn quốc đều phải lần lượt tới học tập lý thuyết Nhân Vị Duy Linh tại trung tâm này, dù là Công giáo hay không Công giáo. Một phần lớn giảng viên và huấn luyện viên của trung tâm là giám mục hoặc linh mục.

http://www.quangduc.com/lichsu/17vnpgsuluan3-37.html


Luận :

Chế độ Diệm phải đối diện với những nguy cơ triệt hạ từ những người chống đối từ những năm mới bắt đầu cầm quyền. Những chống đối này không liên quan gì Phật Giáo. Trong khi cầm quyền bị ám sát hụt, bị đảo chánh không thành. Rõ ràng là Phật Giáo không có vấn đề chống Diệm nhưng là những thành phần khác chống.

Từ nguy cơ bị triệt hạ đã làm chính quyền Diệm tổ chức lại cơ cấu cầm quyền trở thành độc quyền Đảng trị , Gia đình trị có sự góp mặt của Tôn Giáo Thiên Chúa giáo vào việc huấn luyện người. Đây là 1 hành động tách rời quần chúng, nhân dân để tạo thành 1 nhóm riêng cầm quyền đi trái với dân chủ.

Khi chúng ta đưa ra nhận định về một sự kiện hay nhân vật nào đó , muốn nhận định của mình có giá trị thì phải thật sự khách quan .

Trước hết phải đưa ra được những dữ kiện tiêu biểu , đáng tin cậy , kiểm chứng được và cũng từ những nguồn khách quan .

Thứ hai nhận định của ta phải phù hợp với nhân vật và thời điểm đó .



Có 2 vấn đề lớn trong post này , thứ nhất bài được quote là từ một trang chuyên chống ông Diệm . Trang này sử dụng những tài liệu như sau :

1- Sách Chín Năm Máu Lửa Dưới Chế Độ Ngô Đình Diệm của Nguyễn Đam và Thần Phong, lấy tài liệu từ Ủy Ban Tố Cáo Tội Ác Của Chính Quyền Ngô Đình Diệm và từ các cơ quan công quyền khác .

2- Công Cuộc Tranh Đấu Của Phật Giáo Việt Nam Từ Phật Đản Đến Cách Mạng 1963, của Quốc Tuệ biên soạn. Sách dày 548 trang, không mang tên nhà xuất bản nào, có thể do chính tác giả xuất bản. Sách được kiểm duyệt ngày 28 tháng 1 năm 1964 và in xong vào khoảng tháng 6 năm 1964.

3- Lửa Thiêng Đạo Mầu của Lan Đình và Phương Anh biên soạn, không mang tên nhà xuất bản nào, có thể đã do tác giả xuất bản. Sách được kiểm duyệt ngày 17 tháng 12 năm 1963, dày 138 trang và có mang một bài tựa của Phú Tiên Nguyễn Duy Tinh.


Tài liệu đưa ra mà do Ủy Ban Tố Cáo Tội Ác Của Chính Quyền Ngô Đình Diệm biên soạn cùng những cuốn sách không biết do ai xuất bản !!! Thì khách quan chỗ nào ?? :(

Hơn nữa câu lên án " Đây là 1 hành động tách rời quần chúng, nhân dân để tạo thành 1 nhóm riêng cầm quyền đi trái với dân chủ " , là không phù hợp với tình hình lúc đó . CS lúc đó tấn công và phá rối liên tục , miền Nam và nhất là nền Đệ nhất CH có được rảnh rang xây dựng dân chủ đâu , mà lúc đó miền Nam là tiền đồn chống CS của toàn vùng Đông Nam Á , thì đương nhiên chính sách và chiến lược phải có khác với thời bình chứ .

[Ngụy Tặc]

Qua những dữ kiện mà Gánh đã đưa ra , chúng ta thấy được việc Hoà thượng Thích Quảng Đức tự thiêu là một sự việc quan trọng , có nhiều yếu tố liên quan , và có tầm ảnh hưởng lớn đến rất nhiều người , ảnh hưởng như thế nào thì còn tuỳ vào người đó muốn nhìn thấy điều gì .

Tuy vậy vẫn có một số sự kiện là sự thật không thể chối cãi :

1- Chính quyền của ông Diệm đặt nặng vấn đề gia đình trị và Thiên Chúa Giáo .

2- Ông Diệm có những quyết định thiên về bên Công giáo hơn , tạo ra một số bất bình ngấm ngầm trong quân đội .

3- CS lợi dụng sự bất bình này , giàn cảnh nhiều trò gây áp lực chính trị .

4- CS lợi dụng cơ cấu tổ chức lỏng lẻo của Phật giáo để dùng đạo Phật làm tấm bình phong che đậy những hoạt động chống chính quyền của chúng .

5- Việc Hoà thượng Thích Quảng Đức tự thiêu rõ ràng có bàn tay của CSVN nhúng vào chỉ đạo và giàn dựng . Nhưng việc Hoà thượng tự đi đến đó , tự bật lửa thiêu mình là sự thật .

6- Đối với người Á Châu và với Phật giáo thì tự thiêu hay tự sát để phản đối thì không là cái gì lớn lao lắm , nhưng đối với thế giới Tây phương thì là cú sốc rất lớn .

7- Phản ứng của ông Diệm và chính quyền của ông sau sự kiện này thiếu khôn khéo nên không những không hoà giải được với Phật tử mà càng làm tăng thêm sự bất mãn , khiến cho tình hình ngày càng xấu đi .

8- Ảnh hưởng của việc Hoà thượng Thích Quảng Đức tự thiêu đã gián tiếp dẫn đến sự diệt vong của chính quyền ông Diệm và có lẽ cả cái chết của ông và ông Nhu .

9- Đảng CSVN và Trung Cộng lợi dụng việc làm vì đạo của Hoà thượng Thích Quảng Đức để tuyên truyền chống Mỹ , chống luôn ông Diệm . Gián tiếp kết tội Mỹ và ông Diệm đã " ép chết " Hoà thượng .


Gánh sẽ từ từ đưa các dữ kiện liên quan đến các vấn đề trên để các bạn cùng tham khảo .

Một khi đã công nhận sự thật là có sự phân biệt đối xử tôn giáo thì "sự kiện Phật Đản 1963" [ xem wiki: Sự kiện Phật Đản, 1963 ] bị quy kết là chủ trương kỳ thị Phật Giáo của chế độ NĐD là điều tất nhiên. Tuy nhiên, sự thiên vị Thiên Chúa Giáo không chỉ "tạo ra một số bất bình ngấm ngầm trong quân đội" mà là trong tuyệt đại đa số quần chúng Việt Nam vốn là Phật tử hay "đồng hành" cùng PG từ rất xa xưa. Thật ra thì sự bùng vỡ chống đối của PG đối với chế độ NĐD không phải tức thời mà nó là một "giọt nước làm tràn ly vốn đã đầy nước" mà thôi. Ngoài ra, nếu cho rằng "lệnh cấm treo cờ tôn giáo" được mang ra áp dụng đúng vào dịp lễ Phật Đản của chế độ Diệm là 1 điều thiếu khôn khéo, tế nhị nhất thời thì cách đối xử của chế độ Diệm sau đó rõ ràng là mang tinh thần kỳ thị rõ nét hơn.
Một chế độ không dựa vào đa số quần chúng thì sự sụp đổ không mấy hồi.
Có một điều là lâu nay phe nhóm ủng hộ chế độ NĐD đều không muốn nhìn ra những sai lầm chí tử của chế độ này mà tiếp tục "nguỵ tạo" lịch sử để chạy tội cho chế độ nầy mà thôi.
Ông NĐD có lẽ không nhìn thấy hoặc cố tình "phớt lờ" (như bà Nhu đã từng bộc lộ) những sai lầm của mình. Đã vậy, lại cố tình khoát cái áo CS cho PG để sẵn sàng thẳng tay tấn công toàn diện PG như đã làm trong đêm 20 tháng 8 năm 1963.
Túm lại, nguyên nhân có sự chống đối của PG chính là kỳ thị tôn giáo. Thay vì chỉnh đốn lại mình thì anh em ông Diệm lại bai bãi là PG là CS, PG bị CS giựt dây, bla...bla.....Sai lầm nối tiếp sai lầm. Chết là phải.

[Duy_Khang]

Chào Gánh Hàng Hoa!

Tôi đưa dữ liệu có cả ngày tháng, tên tuổi nhân vật trong việc đối lập và đảo chánh Diệm! dữ liệu này là có thật hay không chứ không phải nguồn từ phe ông Diem hay phe chống ông Diệm.

Dữ liệu này chỉ nhằm đưa ra cái nhìn là Diệm không thuận với các phe đối lập là có, và bị người ta tìm cách triệt hạ là có.

1 lần nữa khẳng định của 1 Thượng Nghị Sĩ do chính Tổng Thống Mỹ gởi qua để quan sát và ghi nhận về chế độ Diệm là THẤT BẠI.

Tôi đưa 2 nguồn khác nhau để kiểm chứng lẫn nhau về sự quan sát chế độ Diệm. Nếu Gánh Hàng Hoa có dữ liệu khác trình bày sự thành công của Diệm ngược với nhận xét trên xin đưa ra.

[Duy_Khang]

Qua các sự kiện ám sát, đảo chánh xảy ra nhiều lần trước 1962 và cách Diệm tách rời chính mình ra khối nhân đân Miền Nam với sự khẳng định của Thượng Nghị sĩ Mỹ : THẤT BẠI. Nghĩa là Diệm đang đứng trên bờ hố chuẩn bị 1 phát rớt xuống. Hãy ghi nhận là cuối năm 1962.

Bạn nghĩ sao khi 1 đặc phái viên của Tổng Thống Mỹ được gởi đến quan sát và báo cáo về Diệm mà ghi báo cáo là "Diệm thất bại" thì Mỹ sẽ làm gì ?

[Gánh Hàng Hoa]

Dec 2, 1962:
Senator Mansfield pronounces American aid to South Vietnam wasted


Following a trip to Vietnam at President John F. Kennedy's request, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) becomes the first U.S. official to refuse to make an optimistic public comment on the progress of the war. Originally a supporter of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, Mansfield changed his opinion of the situation after his visit. He claimed that the $2 billion the United States had poured into Vietnam during the previous seven years had accomplished nothing. He placed blame squarely on the Diem regime for its failure to share power and win support from the South Vietnamese people. He suggested that Americans, despite being motivated by a sincere desire to stop the spread of communism, had simply taken the place formerly occupied by the French colonial power in the minds of many Vietnamese. Mansfield's change of opinion surprised and irritated President Kennedy.

dịch :

Ngày 2 tháng 12 năm 1962:
Thượng Nghị Sĩ Mansfield tuyên bố sự giúp đỡ của Mỹ cho Nam Miền Nam là lãng phí!

Sau một chuyến đi đến Việt Nam theo yêu cầu của Tổng thống John F. Kennedy, lãnh đạo đa số Thượng viện Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) trở thành người đầu tiên của Mỹ chính thức từ chối một bình luận lạc quan của công chúng về sự tiến bộ của chiến tranh. Nguyên một người ủng hộ Tổng thống Nam Việt Nam Ngô Đình Diệm, Mansfield thay đổi quan điểm của ông về tình hình sau khi chuyến thăm của ông. Ông tuyên bố rằng $ 2 tỷ USD Hoa Kỳ đã đổ vào Việt Nam trong bảy năm trước đó đã hoàn thành không có gì. Ông đặt đổ lỗi cho thẳng về chế độ Diệm cho sự thất bại của mình để chia sẻ quyền lực và giành được sự ủng hộ của nhân dân miền Nam Việt Nam. Ông đề nghị rằng người Mỹ, dù đã được thúc đẩy bởi một ước muốn chân thành để ngăn chặn sự lây lan của chủ nghĩa cộng sản, đã chỉ đơn giản là nơi trước đây bị chiếm đóng bởi sức mạnh thực dân Pháp trong tâm trí của nhiều người Việt Nam. Mansfield thay đổi ý kiến ​​ngạc nhiên và kích thích Tổng thống Kennedy.

luận :

Vào cuối năm 1962, 1 thượng nghị sĩ tham quan việt nam và đưa ra nhận định là chính quyền Diệm đã lãng phí sự giúp đỡ của Mỹ. và Diệm thất bại trong việc lấy lòng dân mà chỉ lo giành độc quyền.

Sau khi đọc nhận định của vị Senator này Gánh có 2 ý cần nêu ra và nếu được nhờ bạn bổ sung thêm .

Ông Mike Mansfield là NGƯỜI ĐẦU TIÊN có cái nhìn không lạc quan về chính phủ của ông Diệm . Trước kia ông ta cũng là người ủng hộ ông Diệm . Chỉ sau chuyến đi thăm VN năm 1962 thì ông ta mới có thái độ khác .

Vậy câu hỏi nêu ra là

1- Cái gì đã làm ông ta thay đổi cái nhìn ?

2- Năm 1962 có phải là lúc cao trào Phật Giáo xuống đường ( do CS giựt dây ) đang lên ?

3- Những Senators khác đã có nhận định ra sao ? Tại sao duy nhất có mình ông Mansfield nhận định như thế ?


Thêm nữa câu này bạn dịch sai : " Mansfield thay đổi ý kiến ​​ngạc nhiên và kích thích Tổng thống Kennedy " . Chữ irritate có nghĩa là làm cho khó chịu , chứ không phải là kích thích .

Có nghĩa là sự thay đổi thái độ của ông Mansfield làm cho ông Kennedy ngạc nhiên và khó chịu . Vì sao ? Đương nhiên là vì ông Kennedy không đồng ý với nhận định của ông Mansfield . Điều này có nghĩa là cho đến năm 1962 thì TT Kennedy và các senators khác vẫn ( ít nhất là tạm ) hài lòng với những việc làm của chính phủ NDD . Mãi đến khi phong trào Phật giáo bùng nổ ( do CS châm ngòi ) làm ảnh hưởng đến công luận quốc tế thì TT Kennedy mới có cái nhìn khắt khe hơn với chính phủ của ông Diệm ?

[Duy_Khang]

Xin cho hỏi sâu thêm :

1- Chế độ ông Diệm gặp những chống đối từ đâu ? vì sao ?

2- Bạn có thể bình luận thêm rằng việc thoả hiệp với các thế lực chống đối có khả dĩ chăng ? Theo bạn thì có thể thoả hiệp như thế nào ?

3- Điểm này thì đồng ý .

4- Điểm này cũng đồng ý .

5- Ngoài ý kiến của ông Mike Mansfield , các senates khác tại Mỹ nhận định như thế nào ?


Ngoài ra xin cho hỏi , theo bạn , nếu không có sự kiện Thích Quảng Đức , thì với những sai lầm nêu trên , chế độ ông Diệm sẽ sụp đổ khi nào và như thế nào ?

Giải thích phần 1 :

Có nhiều thành phần khác nhau trong quân đội từ các lực lượng khác nhau được kêu gọi quy tụ thành 1 dưới chế độ Cộng Hòa. Tuy là quy tụ thành 1 nhưng chưa chắc có 1 ý tưởng hành động giống nhau nên chuyện mâu thuẩn nhau là không thể tránh được. Tất nhiên có cả những thành phần không ủng hộ chính phủ Diệm.

Giải thích Phần 2 :

Khi hợp nhất nhiều thành phần lực lượng, thì vấn đề phân bố quyền lực
nhằm ổn định quân đội rất quan trọng. Nhưng vấn đề này rất khó làm, từ đó phát sinh ra chuyện diệt trừ lẫn nhau để giành quyền. Tôi không thể phán định được chuyện thỏa hiệp phải thực hiện ra sao, vì Tôi không cầm quyền như Ông Diệm và chuyện đã thành định cuộc. bây giờ đặt giả thuyết là dư thừa.

Giải thích phần 5 :

Ông Mansfield được Tổng Thống phái đi và về báo cáo lại cho Tổng Thống tình hình VN và chế độ Diệm. Ngoài ra không có người nào khác được phái đi thì làm sao có thể đưa ra bình luận về tình hình VN. Hoặc có những người khác mà Tôi không biết kiếm tài liệu ở đâu để xem.

[Gánh Hàng Hoa]

Giải thích phần 5 :

Ông Mansfield được Tổng Thống phái đi và về báo cáo lại cho Tổng Thống tình hình VN và chế độ Diệm. Ngoài ra không có người nào khác được phái đi thì làm sao có thể đưa ra bình luận về tình hình VN.

Có rất nhiều người khác được phái đi .

Muốn hiểu thực sự chuyện gì đã xảy ra khiến cho ông Mansfield thay đổi cái nhìn thì phải đọc toàn bộ bản báo cáo về cuộc họp mặt của họ tại Việt Nam .

Không thể quote vài dòng trong wiki rôì đưa ra nhận định được .

Đây là nguyên bản cuộc họp . Bạn đọc trước đi . Tối nay rảnh Gánh sẽ dịch ra tiếng Việt .

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963

Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 323
323. Memorandum of Conversation1

Saigon, December 1, 1962, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Senators Mansfield, Pell, Smith, Boggs, Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu, Mr. Meloy the Ambassador, Mr. Truong Buu Khanh (interpreter)

The party arrived at Gia Long Palace at 11:30 a.m. Senator Mansfield expressed the group's pleasure at being able to visit Mr. Nhu. He noted that the Ambassador and President Diem had already briefed the Senators on the Strategic Hamlet program, and that the party had just visited National Assembly President Truong Vinh Le and Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho.2 Senator Mansfield asked when the Strategic Hamlet program was likely to be completed. Mr. Nhu said that three years from now was the target date for complete implementation of the Strategic Hamlet program. Two thirds of the population will be living in Strategic Hamlets by January 1, 1963. The political, social, economic, and military revolution involved in the program would not be complete for three years, however. Ambassador Nolting noted that, while speed was important in implementing the program, thoroughness was also essential.

Senator Pell asked Mr. Nhu to explain the over-all Strategic Hamlet concept and its long-range goals. Mr. Nhu said the concept was intended to be a positive contribution to international strategy in the anti-Communist struggle. Subversion is the principal Communist strategy on the international level, and Viet Nam's contribution is to develop a means of countering subversion. As long as the Communists are able to engage in subversive war, the free world cannot negotiate with them, because the Communists will not negotiate in good faith. The war here may be won militarily, but so long as the Communist Bloc retains the capability of waging subversive war, any free world victories will not be definite. By destroying the Communist's subversive capability, we will be placing them in the strategic deadlock in which we presently find ourselves.

Senator Mansfield noted that we were thus trying to turn the tables on the Communists.

Mr. Nhu stated that neither the Communists nor the free world wants a conventional war at this time. The Communists thus have an element of superiority in being able to wage subversive war, and it is not in their interest to negotiate. They will negotiate sincerely only when they are convinced they will not win by subversion. This is the perspective in which the strategic hamlet program should be seen.

Mr. Nhu noted that underdevelopment in Viet Nam has three aspects: 1) a feeling of humiliation, 2) a disunity of minds, resulting in contradictory forces, and 3) Communist subversion. To combat the problem of underdevelopment there are two great historical forces, one tending toward centralization, the other toward fragmentation.

The history of underdeveloped countries in the last fifteen years shows that the tendency toward concentration and centralization has predominated. All governments in underdeveloped countries that have tried democracy have been overthrown and replaced by military regimes. The backward nations have used only one of the great historical forces presently at work, concentration. Mr. Nhu said he had developed the idea that Viet Nam could make use of both of these forces, authoritarianism and democracy, to combat underdevelopment. He compared these forces to positive and negative electrical currents, which produce thunder, fire, and death, when not harmonized. If we can harness these forces, however, we can provoke not destruction but power.

The device for accomplishing this is the strategic hamlet. It attempts to exploit the war in Viet Nam for progress and democracy. This is contrary to history, but Viet Nam is trying to prove history wrong. Thanks to the war, the peasants recognize the usefulness of the strategic hamlet in providing them security. Security, however, is but one consequence of the social and political revolution contained in the strategic hamlet philosophy.

If there is no such revolution in Laos, Thailand or Cambodia, these nations will not be able to fight Communism or to make progress. The international proletariat of underdeveloped countries, and Communist subversion, have upset the classical norms of economic development. A more dialectical concept is needed. Most Afro-Asian countries choose neutrality in order not to be subject to pressures from East or West. Because of their distance from the West, they enjoy the indulgence of the Communists, but they still cannot achieve economic progress. Cambodia and Laos, for example, should wage an economic social, and political revolution.

Senator Pell asked whether land reform was necessary in Cambodia.

Mr. Nhu said that it was necessary, for each man should have his own property. Viet Nam has supported land reform with land development and agricultural credit programs. 87% of the population in Viet Nam is rural; this is the usual ratio for underdeveloped countries. However, this segment of the population enjoys only l/a of the national production, and this gives rise to a feeling of injustice. With the Strategic Hamlets, we hope to be able to reverse this ratio.

The West pays too much attention to winning the sympathy of the population, and not enough to organizing it. If the population is not organized, the Communists will be able to mobilize it against the government overnight. In Cambodia, for instance, the Communists could foment a rebellion at will, because the population is not organized. This would not be done only by political propaganda. In 1954, after the Geneva Agreements, the Communists regrouped 135,000 people to North Vietnam, and 10,000 of these were Cambodians. With this 10,000, they can blackmail 10,000 families, and can infiltrate agents into Cambodia whenever they wish. This is how the problem started in Vietnam.

It is impossible to combat Communist subversion with the personal popularity of the leadership. President Diem, for instance, was elected by the whole people, but the government is still subject to a subversive war.

Senator Mansfield noted that the President had explained this concept in theory to the group yesterday. The Senator stated that the relationship between our countries is excellent, but that occasionally people in the United States read about difficulties with the Western, and especially the United States, press. He said he was raising this question not only from a personal point of view but also from a Congressional standpoint. Some things that happen here create an unfavorable reaction in the United States. The Senator asked whether something could not be done about this problem, bearing in mind security and mutual respect, because it is a serious problem, and really the only one between the two countries. He said that he was asking this in the friendliest spirit.

Mr. Nhu said he was glad that Senator Mansfield had raised this question, as he was concerned with the problem as a part of global strategy. The free world is not adapted to subversive war in all fields. The Western press, especially the American press, is not adapted to subversive war, and lags in the world evolutionary process. For example, American newspaper correspondents in Vietnam are very young and inexperienced

Mr. Nhu stated that he had seen Mr. Crawford, a Newsweek editor, recently and had talked to him in the same vein. Mr. Crawford had asked him why the things he was saying were not known in the United States. Senator Mansfield asked if these things were new to Mr. Crawford. Mr. Nhu said that Mr. Crawford had told him that he had talked to the American Embassy before he called, but that Mr. Nhu's remarks went far beyond anything he had heard. Mr. Nhu said he had told Mr. Crawford that he understood it was difficult for the United States press to send high level correspondents to Viet Nam. However, newsmen must meet minimum standards of intellect and of emotion in order to grasp the problems in Vietnam.

In the case of Vietnam, in addition to Communist infiltration, there exists infiltration from other countries who have interests contrary to those of Vietnam. Vietnam is a former colony, and a certain class of people were left behind after independence who remained attached to colonialism. This class has lost its privileges as the go between for the colonialists and the Vietnamese people. As former landowners, they are the victims of agrarian reform, and therefore discontent. Because they know how to speak foreign languages, they find it possible to communicate with foreigners.

The Ambassador explained that Mr. Nhu was referring to the tendency of foreign correspondents to get their views from French and English speaking Vietnamese, who sometimes provide a distorted view.

Mr. Nhu noted that “our French friends” believe they have been replaced by the Americans, and are dissatisfied.

Before the Strategic Hamlet program, Mr. Nhu stated, there was great discontent in the Vietnamese countryside. Under the pressure of Communist subversion, the army was not capable of protecting the population. Military operations fell into a vacuum because the Army was not helped by the population. The people were dissatisfied with the army, troops were dissatisfied with their officers, and far from protecting the people, the army created popular discontent.

Senator Boggs asked Mr. Nhu to describe the reaction in North Vietnam to the economic and social progress being made in the Republic of Vietnam.

Mr. Nhu said that the North Vietnamese reaction was to seek a method of countering this progress, but that up to now they had not found an adequate one. He said that his objective was not to break the natural process of Communism, but rather to exploit it. The enemy is thus placed in an impasse. The Strategic Hamlets are a point of attraction for VC troops. Traditional in Asia, leaders have been afraid of remote regions, because distance can foster dissidence. The Strategic Hamlets will attract Communist troops and they will abandon their leaders. Mr. Nhu compared this tendency to the tendency of the Chinese who migrated to California to implant themselves there and forget their origins.

Mr. Nhu noted that the Laotian settlement failed to exploit this tendency, because Laotian neutrality, which is really pro-Communist neutrality, is destroying the hope of eventually liberating North Vietnam.

Senator Mansfield pointed out that there was a difference in the Laotian and Vietnamese problems because the Laotians would not fight. Mr. Nhu stated that this was because they do not know how to fight a subversive war. Senator Mansfield observed that the United States had spent 400 million dollars in Laos to help them fight. Mr. Nhu said that they had not been organized and thus did not know how to fight. Senator Mansfield said that the pro-Western Laotians had only shot their guns into the air, and that the Pathet Lao must have been stiffened by North Vietnamese, and even Chinese, soldiers. Mr. Nhu asked why we had not sent our own cadres to stiffen Gen. Phoumi's troops. Senator Mansfield asked if this had ever been suggested. Mr. Nhu said he had suggested it to Governor Harriman and to the French. He went on to say that if, in foreign policy, we say we accept the facts, that means we refuse to break the balance of forces. But we must break the balance of forces if it is not in our favor. One year ago, the balance was against us, but Mr. Nhu would not accept the facts and refused to believe the Laotians would not fight. In Vietnam too, before, to [the?] Strategic Hamlets, the people did not want to fight. As he said earlier, the population was against the soldiers, the soldiers were against the generals, the generals were against the government, and the government was dissatisfied with United States effectiveness. This general dissatisfaction prompted Mr. Nhu to develop the Strategic Hamlet program.

Senator Mansfield noted that Mr. Nhu had said he was dissatisfied with United States aid. The Senator noted that we had sent our best generals to Vietnam, and asked what had been wrong.

Mr. Nhu said that what he had meant was that when the situation was bad, everyone blames his neighbor. He said he had refused to accept these dissatisfactions, and had thought something else was wrong. What had been needed was a master plan corresponding to the requirements of an underdeveloped country in the Twentieth Century. Senator Mansfield asked if he had found it in the Strategic Hamlet plan. Mr. Nhu said that the Strategic Hamlet plan was only one element. He said that it must be considered in the context a) of Vietnamese history, b) of the historic movement of underdeveloped countries, c) of General Taylor's visit, and d) of men in the modern world. It was part of a new kind of humanism. The freedom which one acquires oneself is more precious than the freedom that is given by Santa Claus.

There has been a tremendous enthusiasm arising in the countryside during the last month. Mr. Nhu said he did not reproach the United States press for ignoring this popular movement, but he did notice that the press was not up to date.

Senator Mansfield asked if this was just the American press.

Mr. Nhu said that the American press is the most powerful. He said that his ambition was to bring a positive contribution to the United States, which is the leader of the free world. United States strategy leans on regional organizations, but is weak in underdeveloped areas. These areas have been a dead weight so far for the United States and have made no contribution. Mr. Nhu said that if we succeed in our experiment here, it will be very valuable for all other countries.

The Ambassador said, with respect to the press, that there was always a time lag in reporting. He said he tries every day to explain to the press how things are moving in Vietnam. One mark of the journalist, however, is skepticism toward government releases. The journalist wants to go out and see for himself. If he sees that the government is applying pressure on the people, he compares this with the government's own statements. The Ambassador asked again that there not be a severe reaction to unfavorable stories, as this only increases the skepticism of the press and makes our mutual task more difficult.

Mr. Nhu said that we must not concentrate so much on this question because the American people have a good sense of fair play. Once they recognize their mistakes they change their attitude. For a powerful country such as the United States, opposition to the press is nothing. For a small, poor country at war, like Vietnam, there is great popular sensitivity. Mr. Nhu said that the Vietnamese are conducting an impassioned war, not subject to reason. There are only 14 million South Vietnamese fighting against international communism, represented by 650 million Chinese. Vietnam has been fighting 23 years for subjective reasons. Its passion must be respected as that is all it has left.

He said that he thought the attitude of the American press had changed, because the Americans have a high respect for those who are willing to fight. The Vietnamese are proud to fight, and want to be proud of their friends. He said that the United States reaction to the Cuba situation had made the Vietnamese proud.

Senator Mansfield said that we were very pleased to hear this.

Mr. Nhu continued that the Vietnamese had been humiliated, however, by the United States policy in Laos and Cambodia.

Senator Smith asked Mr. Nhu to describe the background of the Cambodian and Laotian problems, and to estimate how long they would last. Mr. Nhu said that when the United States found an adequate solution for subversive war, we would win. So long as we have no solution, we will be humiliated.

Relationships between Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia include United States involvement as a factor. What the Communists are seeking in Laos and Cambodia is to weaken Vietnam and to drive the Americans out. That is all. They accomplished this in Laos and Cambodia and are trying to do it in Vietnam. The Ambassador said that they had not done it yet in Cambodia. Mr. Nhu said that Cambodia had asked that the MAAG withdraw. The Ambassador noted that this had not yet been done, and that the problem was very delicate.

Mr. Nhu said that both Souvanna and Sihanouk realize that their value lies in their distance from the U.S. If they were committed to the U.S., they would lose their value. By leaning toward the Chinese Communists, they retain their position with the U.S., but if they aligned themselves with the U.S. they would be despised. They have a means of pressure on the U.S., but the U.S. has no means of pressure on them.

The Ambassador asked whether Mr. Nhu thought Prince Sihanouk would like to see North Vietnam take over South Vietnam. Mr. Nhu said that Sihanouk hates North Vietnam. There are two elements in his policy: 1) the conviction that communism is the wave of the future, and 2) the desire to retain his bargaining position with the U.S. He takes advantage of the fact that America has no means of pressure on him. If we develop a theory of subversive war, and can wage it ourselves, we will have a means of pressure on him.

Mr. Nhu continued that in the meantime, America should not drop its existing friends for potential friends. Sihanouk and Souvanna are not friends of America. America has a firm friend here in South Vietnam, and must not sacrifice it for the sake of those who will never be America's friends. If the Communist Chinese come to Southeast Asia, Vietnam will fight them. The Vietnamese would like to fight the Chinese, and there are elements in North Vietnam that would support such a war.

At this point the meeting broke up. The Ambassador asked Mr. Nhu, after the meeting, for clarification on one point. Had Mr. Crawford of Newsweek magazine said that he had not understood our explanation of the situation in Vietnam? Mr. Nhu said that Mr. Crawford had understood it, but that he, Mr. Nhu, had clarified his understanding of the problem.

On leaving, Senator Mansfield thanked Mr. Nhu for being so frank and direct. Mr. Nhu said that his frankness was an expression of Vietnamese friendship for the United States, and added that America is Vietnam's only friend in the world.

1 Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 22.1. Mansfield Visit to Saigon. Confidential. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which is apparently a draft as it contains numerous handwritten corrections. The meeting was held at Gia Long Palace. On October 18 Kennedy had written Mansfield asking him to lead a bipartisan group of Senators to visit Berlin, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia to review the situation and U.S. policies in these areas. (University of Montana Library, Mansfield Papers, Series XXII, Box 95, Folder 13) The Senators left Washington on November 7 and returned December 17.



http://history.state.gov/historicald...961-63v02/d323

[Gánh Hàng Hoa]

Và đây là toàn bộ nguyên văn bản report của ông Mansfield .


1961–1963
Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 330
330. Report by the Senate Majority Leader (Mansfield)1

Washington, December 18, 1962.

SOUTHEAST ASIA—VIETNAM

We have problems of varying complexity with all of the nations in Southeast Asia. Clearly, however, the critical focus is south Viet Nam. Developments there in the next two or three years may well influence greatly the trends in the whole region for the following ten or twenty.

And at this point it is far from certain what will develop in Viet Nam. One thing is reasonably clear: From somewhere about 1956 or '57, the unusual combination of factors which had resulted in the establishment of the Republic under Ngo Dinh Diem began to lose its impulse. A drift set in at about that time, responsibility for which is only partially ascribable to the shortcomings of the Vietnamese government. Our aid programs, military and non-military, after all, were one of the principal sources of the origin and the continuance of that government's power and these were properly open to charges of being ill-conceived and badly administered. They did little with the time which was bought at Geneva in the sense of stimulating the growth of indigenous roots for the political structure in Saigon. That structure is, today, far more dependent on us for its existence than it was five years ago. If Vietnam is the cork in the Southeast Asian bottle then American aid is more than ever the cork in the Vietnamese bottle.

We have now had for some months new concepts and a new American approach in Viet Nam. But the purpose of both remains, in essentials, what the purpose of other approaches have been from the outset. Indeed, it was distressing on this visit to hear the situation described in much the same terms as on my last visit although it is seven years and billions of dollars later. Viet Nam, outside the cities, is still an insecure place which is run at least at night largely by the Vietcong. The government in Saigon is still seeking acceptance by the ordinary people in large areas of the countryside. Out of fear or indifference or hostility the peasants still withhold acquiescence, let alone approval of that government. In short, it would be well to face the fact that we are once again at the beginning of the beginning.

But as noted there are now new concepts and a new American approach. The new concepts, as undoubtedly you are aware, center on the strategic hamlets. The new approach involves the re-oriented and expanded economic aid program and the use of many thousands of supporting American military personnel as well as the special forces which are concentrating their efforts on the tribal people, the Montagnards.

Although the first results have scarcely been registered, the evaluations of the new approach—Vietnamese and American—in Saigon are extremely optimistic. Those bearing responsibility—Vietn amese and American—speak of success in the solution of the problem in terms of a year or two.

Having heard optimistic predictions of this kind, with the introduction of other “new concepts,” beginning with French General Navarre in Hanoi in 1953, certain reservations seem to me to be in order. It is true that Vietminh casualty counts have been rising but the accuracy of these counts is open to question. Moreover, it should be noted that the estimates of Vietcong core strength have also been rising. The total of 20,000 which is now calculated at CINCPAC is the highest which I have ever encountered since the Geneva accords of 1954.

Responsible Americans in Saigon believe that exceptional progress has been made in winning over the Montagnards by the special forces. This is an important achievement because the location of these tribal people has considerable strategic significance in terms of north-south supply trails. But it should also be recognized that in terms of the major struggle the Montagnards are peripheral. In the last analysis, the Saigon government will stand or fall on the basis not of the several hundred thousand primitive Montagnards, but the millions of Vietnamese in the villages, towns and cities.

Apart from these two tangibles—higher Vietminh casualties and progress in winning over the Montagnards—there are also reports of improvements in the security of road travel and in the movement of rice and other commodities out of the countryside into the cities. These are excellent indicators of progress but the reports are not yet conclusive as to trends.

At this point, therefore, the optimistic predictions of success must be regarded as deriving primarily from the development of the theory of the strategic hamlets by Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu and by the injection of new energy which has been provided by additional American aid and personnel. The real tests are yet to come.

Reservations are in order because in the first place, the rapid success of the concept of the strategic hamlet would seem to depend on the assumption that the Vietminh will remain wedded to their present tactics and will be unable to devise significant and effective revisions to meet the new concepts and the new highly mobile firepower of the American-trained forces. That may be the case but it would be unwise to underestimate the resourcefulness of any group which has managed to survive years of the most rugged kind of warfare. In the second place, rapid success of the new concepts depends upon the assumption that the great bulk of the people in the countryside sustain the Vietminh merely out of fear or, at best, indifference. There is really no effective measure of the accuracy of this assumption. It may indeed contain a good deal of truth but the critical question is how much truth. The temptation to extrapolate our own reactions on to the Vietnamese peasant in this kind of a situation is as obvious as it is dangerous.

The fact is that only experience and the most acute observation and objective reporting will throw real light on the accuracy of this assumption. To date we have not had enough of any of those essential ingredients of sound judgment. If experience should prove that there is less rather than more truth in the assumption that fear or indifference are the keystones of the Vietcong hold over the countryside, the target date for success will be delayed indefinitely beyond the year or two of the present predictions.

This is not to say that even a serious error in this assumption renders success impossible. If we were prepared to increase the commitment of men and military aid to compensate for the error it is not impossible that the concept of the strategic hamlet could still be brought into existence, in time, despite widespread support of the peasants for the Vietcong. And if the Vietnamese government, with more aid, could then turn the secured hamlets into a significantly more satisfactory way of life than the peasants have known, then it is conceivable that a deep disaffection towards the Vietcong could be induced. But it would be well to recognize that any such reorientation involves an immense job of social engineering, dependent on great outlays of aid on our part for many years and a most responsive, alert and enlightened leadership in the government of Vietnam.

Even assuming that aid over a prolonged period would be available, the question still remains as to the capacity of the present Saigon government to carry out the task of social engineering. Ngo Dinh Diem remains a dedicated, sincere, hardworking, incorruptible and patriotic leader. But he is older and the problems which confront him are more complex than those which he faced when he pitted his genuine nationalism against, first, the French and Bao Dai and then against the sects with such effectiveness. The energizing role which he played in the past appears to be passing to other members of his family, particularly to Ngo Dinh Nhu. The latter is a person of great energy and intellect who is fascinated by the operations of political power and has consummate eagerness and ability in organizing and manipulating it. But it is Ngo Dinh Diem, not Ngo Dinh Nhu, who has such popular mandate to exercise power as there is in south Vietnam. In a situation of this kind there is a great danger of the corruption of unbridled power. This has implications far beyond the persistent reports and rumors of fiscal and similar irregularities which are, in any event, undocumented. More important is its effect on the organization of the machinery for carrying out the new concepts. The difficulties in Vietnam are not likely to be overcome by a handful of paid retainers and sycophants. The success of the new approach in Vietnam presupposes a great contribution of initiative and self-sacrifice from a substantial body of Vietnamese with capacities for leadership at all levels. Whether that contribution can be obtained remains to be seen. For in the last analysis it depends upon a diffusion of political power, essentially in a democratic pattern. The trends in the political life of Vietnam have not been until now in that direction despite lip service to the theory of developing democratic and popular institutions “from the bottom up” through the strategic hamlet program.

To summarize, our policies and activities are designed to meet an existing set of internal problems in south Vietnam. North Vietnam infiltrates some supplies and cadres into the south; together with the Vietnamese we are trying to shut off this flow. The Vietcong has had the offensive in guerrilla warfare in the countryside; we are attempting to aid the Vietnamese military in putting them on the defensive with the hope of eventually reducing them at least to ineffectiveness. Finally, the Vietnamese peasants have sustained the Vietcong guerrillas out of fear, indifference or blandishment and we are helping the Vietnamese in an effort to win the peasants away by offering them the security and other benefits which may be provided in the strategic hamlets.

That, in brief, is the present situation. As noted, there is optimism that success will be achieved quickly. My own view is that the problems can be made to yield to present remedies, provided the problems and their magnitude do not change significantly and provided that the remedies are pursued by both Vietnamese and Americans (and particularly the former) with great vigor and self-dedication.

Certainly, if these remedies do not work, it is difficult to conceive of alternatives, with the possible exception of a truly massive commitment of American military personnel and other resources—in short going to war fully ourselves against the guerrillas—and the establishment of some form of neocolonial rule in south Vietnam. That is an alternative which I most emphatically do not recommend. On the contrary, it seems to me most essential that we make crystal clear to the Vietnamese government and to our own people that while we will go to great lengths to help, the primary responsibility rests with the Vietnamese. Our role is and must remain secondary in present circumstances. It is their country, their future which is most at stake, not ours.

To ignore that reality will not only be immensely costly in terms of American lives and resources but it may also draw us inexorably into some variation of the unenviable position in Vietnam which was formerly occupied by the French. We are not, of course, at that point at this time. But the great increase in American military commitment this year has tended to point us in that general direction and we may well begin to slide rapidly toward it if any of the present remedies begin to falter in practice.

As indicated, our planning appears to be predicated on the assumption that existing internal problems in south Vietnam will remain about the same and can be overcome by greater effort and better techniques. But what if the problems do not remain the same? To all outward appearances, little if any thought has been given in Saigon, at least, to the possibilities of a change in the nature of the problems themselves. Nevertheless, they are very real possibilities and the initiative for instituting change rests in enemy hands largely because of the weakness of the Saigon government. The range of possible change includes a step-up in the infiltration of cadres and supplies by land or sea. It includes the use of part or all of the regular armed forces of north Vietnam, reported to be about 300,000 strong, under Vo Nguyen Giap. It includes, in the last analysis, the possibility of a major increase in any of many possible forms of Chinese Communist support for the Vietcong.

None of these possibilities may materialize. It would be folly, however, not to recognize their existence and to have as much clarification in advance of what our response to them will be if they do.

This sort of anticipatory thinking cannot be undertaken with respect to the situation in Vietnam alone. The problem there can be grasped, it seems to me, only as we have clearly in mind our interests with respect to all of Southeast Asia. If it is essential in our interests to maintain a quasi-permanent position of power on the Asian mainland as against the Chinese then we must be prepared to continue to pay the present cost in Vietnam indefinitely and to meet any escalation on the other side with at least a commensurate escalation of commitment of our own. This can go very far, indeed, in terms of lives and resources. Yet if it is essential to our interests then we would have no choice.

But if on the other hand it is, at best, only desirable rather than essential that a position of power be maintained on the mainland, then other courses are indicated. We would, then, properly view such improvement as may be obtained by the new approach in Vietnam primarily in terms of what it might contribute to strengthening our diplomatic hand in the Southeast Asian region. And we would use that hand as vigorously as possible and in every way possible not to deepen our costly involvement on the Asian mainland but to lighten it.

It is uncertain what the prospects for doing so may be, even if we were inclined to the latter course. The experience in Laos which, in effect, is an essay in that direction is not cause for sanguine expectation. On the one hand, there are the anticipated difficulties with the Pathet Lao. Their leader in Vientiane, Prince Souphanovong, is brilliant and capable but he is also hard-bitten and relentless. His relations with Souvanna Phouma are delicate and uncertain and there are reports that even the limited degree of cooperation which he has extended has come under attack from his own faction. The cooperation with Souvanna Phouma from the other Laotian group headed by Phoumi Nosavan has also been circumscribed and uncertain.

( còn tiếp )

[Gánh Hàng Hoa]

These difficulties, of course, were to be anticipated and much depends on Souvanna Phouma if they are to be surmounted. It is our policy to support him fully and the American Ambassador is making a noble effort to carry out that policy. The latter needs and must have the cooperation of all departments in this effort. Moreover, his views as to what is necessary should be most carefully regarded in the design of his instructions. This point needs stressing, for one has the distinct impression in Laos that a great deal of executive branch energy is going into the preparation for contingencies in anticipation of the failure of the policy of neutralization under Souvanna Phouma and not enough into making the policy work. The job will be sufficiently difficult even in the best of circumstances and it is not at all unlikely that Souvanna Phouma may tire of it and abandon it unless the efforts of every department and agency of our own government which may be involved are bent energetically to the achievement of our policy under the direction of the Ambassador.

If Laos does not yet offer much hope of an eventual lightening of our burdens throughout Southeast Asia, Cambodia stands in stark contrast. Its internal stability is exceptional for contemporary Southeast Asia. It is led by Prince Sihanouk with dedication, energy and astuteness. And it has made steady and most impressive social and economic progress in the past few years. It is an illustration of what can be achieved in the lush lands of the region in conditions of peace, with a vigorous and progressive indigenous leadership and a judicious and limited use of outside aid. It is also an experience which can shed light on the possibilities of eventually lightening our burdens in Southeast Asia.

For that reason if for no other, it seems to me essential that we go very far in attempting to find practicable solutions which will meet the Cambodian desire for reassurance that it will not be overwhelmed from either Vietnam on the east or Thailand on the west. Cambodian fears exist. They are probably excessive fears at least in present circumstances. Nevertheless, they are powerful and deeply felt fears based in part on history and it would be most unwise to underestimate their potential influence on Cambodian policy. It would be most unfortunate if they pushed Cambodia further in the direction of China.

Our relations with this little country have been, to say the least, erratic from the outset and, it seems to me, largely unnecessarily so. There have been unfortunate clashes of personality, lack of understanding and even more serious matters involved. Official relations now seem to me to be well-handled and insofar as we may be responsible for such strains as exist, they would appear ascribable to policy as it is formulated in Washington not as it is administered in Phnom Penh.

The Cambodians are apparently prepared for a further reduction in the remaining one-sided aid commitment which has already been reduced considerably. We should welcome this opportunity and at the same time seek to broaden mutually advantageous relationships. The key to bringing about this transition without alienating Cambodia is to be found in its interrelationships and ours with its neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam. It is, in my opinion, clearly desirable to search vigorously for this key.

It is apparent that in Thailand, the bent of our policy with respect not only to Cambodia but to Laos as well is not appreciated and, at best, enjoys only a grudging tolerance. Cambodia is held in low esteem and the resentments over the recent adverse International Court decision still smolder.

With respect to Laos, the Thais have either not wanted the policy of neutralization to work or have not believed that it would work from the outset. They are still clearly skeptical. It is probable that once it became clear that we would not commit ourselves militarily to the recapture of all of Laos, the Thais preferred a solution by military partition rather than the attempt at neutralization, with the United States committed to the defense of at least southern Laos. This may still be their expectation.

American actions in Thailand appear to support the Thai skepticism at least to the point of providing heavily for contingencies in the event neutralization fails in Laos. Several new jet-ports have been built in eastern Thailand. In the recent withdrawal of the American combat unit, a great deal of heavy transport equipment, particularly for fuel, has been left behind. And, finally, the United States military command intends to put back into Thailand in the near future, a contingent of forces about equal in number to those being withdrawn for the purpose of constructing a fuel pipe line across that country.

The cost of these various operations when added to the already immense and continuing input of aid of various kinds is cause for serious concern. Thailand is relatively prosperous. It has a very substantial foreign trade from which other nations such as Japan and Western Germany profit greatly along with Thailand. There is talk of aid from other sources but it is almost entirely talk of aid on a loan or trade basis, with a clear expectation of direct and tangible returns to the donors. At the same time, we are carrying, virtually, the entire burden of aid for Thailand's defense and other purposes which carry little in the way of tangible return. This sort of an arrangement leaves us with the onerous burdens while others reap the fruits.

It is an arrangement that will probably be continued as long as we are prepared to countenance it. Sudden changes in our willingness to sustain these burdens might produce serious adverse consequences. But it seems to me that a constant pressure must be maintained to bring about a progressive reduction in our commitment by having the Thais themselves and others take on more of the onerous burdens. That pressure is not in evidence in our policies and their administration at the present time.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, in Burma and in Malaya, we have a minimum of commitment. In the case of Burma, this fortuitous state of affairs would appear to be largely one of Burmese choice. The Burmese have settled the border question with China along the McCarthy line (an extension of the McMahon line) and to their satisfaction. They are fumed inward in their attitudes, seeking only to stay clear of the India-China dispute. They are also fearful of antagonizing China by too dose dealings with us. But there is no assurance that in the future a Burmese government, hard-pressed to maintain itself in an internal political situation which is never far from chaos, will not seek substantial aid from the United States. It seems to me that we must steel ourselves against that day. And, in all honesty, it seems to me that the key to staying clear of still another costly commitment on the Asian mainland is to be found in restraining our own bureaucratic eagerness to help.

In the case of Malaya, except for a large and expanding Peace Corps, we are maintaining relatively orthodox and inexpensive relationships with a minimum of commitment on our part. However, this excellent state of affairs may be strained by the effort to bring Malaysia into existence. It is probable that the British hope, by the unification of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo, to lighten their burdens in that region while retaining as much as possible of their influence and their highly profitable economic position.

Without criticizing this attempt, it should be noted that our approach must be one of the greatest delicacy, primarily because of the attitudes of the Philippines. There are already indications of a measure of collaboration developing between the Philippines and Indonesia in resisting the formation of Malaysia. It is a collaboration which we should do nothing to stimulate by inadvertent statements or actions.

It is likely that Malaysia will come into existence some time next year. There are already feelers being put out for the establishment of an aid program from the United States. It seems to me, again, that we must resist this effort to deepen our commitment and, again, the key is to put restraints on our own bureaucratic eagernesses. It is one thing to provide loans to a nation such as Malaysia which is clearly a good risk or to send Peace Corpsmen to the remote areas of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo where a little technical knowledge can go a long way. But it is quite another thing to take on major and continuing tasks of military organization and supply and the internal development of still one more country in Southeast Asia, responsibilities which we assume in name at least and also to some degree in fact, every time we establish these aid-missions. It would seem appropriate that any continuing aid to Malaysia should remain the responsibility of the U.K. and the Commonwealth rather than being shifted to the United States.

Viewing Southeast Asia as a whole, the situation is one of varying conditions of stability. The future of freedom in the area is far from certain. Except for some significant and effective French efforts in Cambodia and Commonwealth efforts in the Malayan situation, the principal externally borne burdens fall upon us.

If we were to withdraw abruptly from beneath these burdens, there would be a major collapse in many places and what would follow is by no means certain. Obviously, much would depend upon the capacity and urge of the Chinese to move into the vacuum.

We cannot afford to withdraw suddenly from these burdens. While we must make every effort to have others share them, we would, I believe, be deluding ourselves if we expected very much help from other outside sources in the near future.

The real question which confronts us, therefore, is how much are we ourselves prepared to put into Southeast Asia and for how long in order to serve such interests as we may have in that region? Before we can answer this question, we must reassess our interests, using the words “vital” or “essential” with the greatest realism and restraint in the reassessment. When that has been done, we will be in a better position to estimate what we must, in fact, expend in the way of scarce resources, energy and lives in order to preserve those interests. We may well discover that it is in our interests to do less rather than more than we are now doing. If that is the case, we will do well to concentrate on a vigorous diplomacy which would be designed to lighten our commitments without bringing about sudden and catastrophic upheavals in Southeast Asia.

1 Source: Senate Document 93-11. Printed in U.S. Senate 93d Congress, 1st session, Two Reports on Vietnam and Southeast Asia to the President of the United States by Senator Mike Mansfield (Washington, April 1973), pp. 7-14. For Mansfield's report to the Foreign Relations Committee, see U.S. Senate, Vietnam and Southeast Asia,Report of Senator Mike Mansfield … to the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, 1963).

http://history.state.gov/historicald...961-63v02/d330